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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focusses on the legal parameters of the 
restriction on competition with rail transport. This restric-
tion is commonly known as the "rail restriction" or, in 
times past, "the 40-mile limit" We shall be concerned to 
look first at the policies behind the restriction.Then we 
shall examine the actual legal parameters of the restriction 
and their operation. We shall then move on to postulate 
a theoretical model by which we might evaluate the legal 
parameters and the courts' role in interpreting and applying 
them. This model throws up three aspects of decision-
making inputs - policy, principles and rules. We wish to 
analyse and evaluate the legal parameters of the restriction 
in these terms. In so doing we are attempting to illustrate 
the nature of the guide-lines for decision which the restric-
tion lays down. This illustration highlights in turn the 
nature of the various decision-making process. 
II. POLICY ELEMENTS IN TRANSPORT LICENSING 
A. Introduction 
As the title indicates, in this section we shall 
examine the policy elements of transport legislation. The 
scope of this paper embraces neither an evaluation of 
transport economic policies nor a general treatise upon 
transport policy. Thus the economic merits of the rail 
restriction are not our concern. Our task is two-fold. 
First, we shall identify the overall purpose of transport 
policy and seek to outline the various forms of transport 
co-ordination and assistance to individual modes of 
transport. Secondly, we shall discuss the need to provide 
assistance to public transport operations (with particular 
reference to New Zealand Railways) together with the 
regulatory restriction on competition with rail. 
Some understanding of New Zealand transport policy may 
stem from an appreciation of the importance of transport 
to this country. Distribution is intimately tied to 
virtually every manufacturing process. To give but one 
example( one writer has stated that "any economist would 
explain that the function of the economic system in a 
modern society is to create value, and that value is 
created by moving things from where they are not wanted to 
where they are wanted. Without a transport system a huge 
quantity of the production of New Zealand would be worth-
less. It has value only because it can be carried to 
markets where it can be sold." Yet transport also brings 
environmental and social problems in large proportion. 
Furthermore, the different modes of transport do not co-
exist in total harmony. The over-riding question for 
1. J. Child in Policy and Transport New Zealand Institute 
of Public Administration, Wellington 1973 p.68. Further-
more, one estimate (by another New Zealand economist) 
quoted in Dr Child's paper, is that the labour content 
of the transport industry is 14% of the total work force 
and the capital content constitutes 31% of our capital. 
transport policy was well put by M.R. Palmer: 
B. 
"Just how can this benevolent but clumsy giant be 
controlled and set to work usefully and efficiently, 
yet without smashing the 2nvironment or tripping over the economic snags?" 
The Purpose of Transport Policy 
If a government wishes to have a hand in the direction 
of transport within its domain it must decide what its aims 
are. 
In presenting the "New Zealand Transport Policy Study 113 
to the government in 1974, Wilbur Smith stated that "The 
basic purpose of the study was to determine the most 
effective means of co-ordinating the use and development of 
various modes of transport in the country so that resources 
devoted to transport can be used in the most efficient 
manner. 114 The two primary concepts of policy envisaged 
were thus co-ordination (the means) and efficiency (the end). 
Co-ordination. The Study considered that "Basic 
efficiency issues arise primarily from the availability of 
alternative technological modes in combination with dis-
similar transportation requirements imposed on the 
/transport/ system by different commodities and shippers in - - 5 
New Zealand." Thus effective policies were seen as 
establishing "complementary relationships 116 which entail 
7 "co-ordination among the modes." Co-ordination was 
seen in physical, functional and economic terms. The 
2. ibid p.8 
3. by Wilbur Smith and Associates, p repared for The Ministry 
of Transport, Government of New Zealand, 1973 2 Vols. 
The most extensive study of its kind in New Zealand. 
4. ibid. Letter of 8th April 1974. This objective was 
the central feature of the terms of reference laid 
down for the Study. 
5. idib. Part V Chap.l p.1-6. 
6. ibid 
7. ibid 
4 
important point for our purposes is that co-ordination is 
seen in terms of co-ordination among modes as well as 
within modes. Therefore rail transport is not the sole 
concern of transport policy . It is only one of several 
modes of transport. In addition to co-ordination within 
transport, the whole transport sector itself has to be 
co-ordinated with the country's overall social and economic 
activities and objectives. Accordingly transport itself 
is a subject of co-ordination. 
Efficiency . This concept primarily connotes 
minimisation of resources expended in satisfying transport 
needs. It calls for a very broad analysis of resources, 
mainly in relation to economic factors. In addition 
transport policy must be measured against environmental and 
social f?Olicies . 
The main points which we wish to draw from this brief 
outline are first, the overall purpose in policy is lateral 
modal co-ordination together with co-ordination within 
modes with the aim of achieving efficiency; secondly, 
this purpose is very broad and must be broken down into 
specific policies to be of sense and use; thirdly, the 
questions involved are extremely broad, difficult and are 
social, environmental and economic in nature. 
C. Forms of Transport Co-orctination 
The Study identified four main policy sectors as 
essential to any nation-wide transport policy. 8 These 
were: pricing, regulation, investment and fiscal policies . 
The Study described transport policy as "essentially a 
seamless web" Sa and was careful to point the "complex 
9 inter-relationships involved in even a policy sub-sector." 
8 . ibid Part II Chap.l p 1-1. 
8a . ibid Part V Chap.l p 1-12 
9. ibid 
Nevertheless, it saw the four policy sectors mentioned above 
as providing the most meaningful distinctions in the policy 
field. lO These four sectors or mechanisms were said to 
influence fundamentally "transport efficiency both generally 
and in terms of intermodal relationships 11 • 11 Overall 
the Study proposed a more competitive approach to the 
provision of transport services. It suggested the easing 
of regulatory restrictions in deference to regulation based 
on market variables. Thus it proposed a move away from 
the rail restriction and licensing systems. The p rimary 
judgment which the Study was making on the rail restriction 
was that it did not allow enough flexibility to achieve 
the most efficient allocation of traffic. 12 
We wish to make two points regarding the forms of 
transport co-ordination. The first is that the rail 
restriction constitutes only one of the available forms 
of co-ordination. Secondly, the restriction is clearly a 
policy mechanism and thus reflects and represents transport 
policy. As such it is a specific part of the "seamless 
web" of transport policy. 
D. The Need to Assist New Zealand Railways (NZR) in its 
Operation within the Transport Sector 
NZR is a very large operation. In 1976 it employed 
21,658 people and showed fixed assets (at book value) of 
$407,126,000. Thus it is a significant financial entity 
10. A useful summary of t he functions of these four sectors 
in respect of efficiency and co-ordination can be found 
at pp 5-9 of the Summary contained in Vol.l of the Study. 
11. Supra Part V Chap 1 p 1-13 
12. It should be noted that there has been some disagreement 
with the findings of the Study and over the question of 
how co-ordination is best achieved. As we noted before 
we are not engaged in an evaluation of the policies and 
accordingly will not pursue this question. 
in its own right and it may be argued that simply by 
virtue of being a public utility of this size it deserves 
protection. On the other hand it may be that one is 
protecting an inefficient organisation, or giving a form 
of assistance that is not needed. The 1976 13 and 1977 14 
Annual Reports of the Department provide interesting 
comparisons:-
Net Loss Gross Revenue Gross Expenditure 
1976 $66,500,000 Up 10.6% on Up 17.1% on 
previous year previous year 
1977 $17,200,000 Up 45.7% on Up 11.5% on 
previous year previous year 
In introducing the 1977 report to Parliament the Minister 
stated that the increased revenue in that year resulted 
from buoyant freight traffic and increases in charges 
effected in 1976. 15 We are not in a position to assess 
these results and simply wish to note that the Government's 
policy in increasing rail charges was stated to be one of 
reducing the burden on taxpayers and making NZR a 
commercially viable organisation. While recognising that 
increased traffic contributed to a proportion of this 
dramatic recovery it is interesting to observe the signifi-
cant effect of pricing on the Department's economic 
viability. 
But the need for assistance to NZR is not established 
by its size, public nature or internal viability per se. 
These are naturally factors to be taken into account but 
the true nature of the answer lies outside the Railways 
Department itself. We have shown that transport policy 
serves the wider purpose of overall efficiency through 
lateral transport co-ordination. Rail is but one mode. 
13. Report of the Railways Department for the year ended 
31st March 1976. 
14. Report of the Railways Department for the year ended 
31st March 1977. 
15. ibid p. 3 
, 
However that does not mean that NZR should be treated 
in exactly the same way as all other transport operations. 
By way of example, inasmuch as it is a public operation 
it is significantly different from a private operation in 
regard to pricing alone. The Study notes that in the case 
of private enterprise 
"financial costs must be employed as the pricing 
reference in deference to profitability requirements. 
In public operations represented by New Zealand 
Railways (NZR) and the National Airways Corporation 
(NAC), profitability is a consideration secondary to 
maintaining traffic allocations among the modes to 
minimise costs. 
NZR rates are a particularly effective instrument for 
promoting market conditions under which shipper 
freedom of choice results in allocative efficiency. 
Accepting private enterprise rates as a datum, NZR 
rates can be used to compensate for private sector 
differences between financial and economic costs 
which run counter to allocative efficiency . 11 16 
This statement reflects the preference of the Study 
for market variables as the means of regulation of shippers' 
choices of modes. It also illustrates the way in which a 
public utility can be used to achieve an efficient 
allocation of traffic between modes. As stated previously 
pricing is but one way in which to preserve traffic for, 
or divert traffic from one particular mode. However, the 
point which we wish to stress is that a policy of preference 
(or non-preference) for a mode results from a very 
difficult and wide-ranging assessment of that mode in 
relation to other modes and of all the modes in relation 
to each other. 
The regulations restricting competition with rail 
represent just such a wide-ranging comparative modal 
assessment . It is therefore appropriate to identify the 
particular policy reasons for the restriction. 
16. (supra) Summary, Vol I p.6 
When transport licensing was introduced in 1931 it 
was intended to fulfil three purposes : to protect Railway 
Department revenue, to reduce wear on roads and to create 
stable conditions in the industry. 17 The question with 
which the Study was confronted was whether the restriction 
should be retained. The arguments in favour of retention 
identified by the Study,together with its comments were: 
"(1) It protects railway investment - A large 
proportion of rail expenditure cannot be avoided in 
the short term even if traffic reduces; some costs are 
fixed and others such as wagon and locomotive costs, 
where the equipment has a long life, can only be 
adjusted gradually. 
A regulation, such as the 40 mile limit, may have 
application as a short-term measure to avoid a rapid 
erosion of rail traffic. However, in the long term 
such a measure is likely to result in over-investment 
and inefficient utilization of investment. 
(2) It protects roads - On some roads, particularly 
those with high traffic volumes, any substantial 
increase in traffic will require road widening. A 
rail restriction may h ave application, at least in 
the short run, in protecting heavily trafficked roads 
and avoiding road widening. 
(3) It enables NZR to cross subsidise unprofitable 
services - Restrictions on road traffic enable rail 
rates to recover, from profitable traffic, losses 
incurred on unprofitable social services and fixed 
costs. However, such a method of subsidy forces non-
optimal resource use throughout the transport system 
and if thus an inefficient way of maintaining sub-
sidised services. " 
(The unprofitable services referred to here fall 
under the heading of "social services." These 
services are a burden on the remainder of the 
system and call for abnormally high rates on profitable 
services.) 
"(4) It enables NZR to apply differential rail rates -
The present rail rate structure retains many of the 
discriminatory features from the days when rail had 
a monopoly. If competition is to be allowed, rail 
17. ibid Part VLL Chap 1 p .1-7 
18. Quotations utilised in this section are to be found at 
pp 74-76 of the Summary to the Study. A more detailed 
outline of these arguments occupies pp 1-14 - 1-23 of 
Part VII Chap 1. 
rates will need to be adjusted to ensure that rail 
retains that component of highly rated traffic for 
which it is the most efficient mode. It is clear 
that the present rail schedules could not be revised 
overnight because of the impact it would have on 
industries located in relation to the present structure. 
This alone does not justify retnetion but argues for 
a change-over period. 
(5) It avoids competition in a thin market - Free 
competition may not produce the best allocation of 
resources if "thin market" conditions apply. This 
is the case where total fixed and variable costs 
could be reduced if all traffic moved by the same 
mode. However, since roads are required for 
general access, such a situation seems unlikely. 
(6) It allows imperfections in prices and taxes -
The 40 mile limit over-rides prices as a determinant 
of modal choice, and whether prices are related to 
economic costs has no significance. " 
(This point requires enlargement. It concerns 
inefficient pricing mechanisms. The primary point is 
that under the present system the limit does play a 
part in reducing the social cost of transport -
particularly in terms of cost structure, direct social 
t d · 1 · 19) cos an uti ity 
"(7) It allows for imperfect shipper knowledge - One 
problem of leaving the choice to the user is that the 
shipper may not have sufficient information available 
to him or he may perceive the information incorrectly. 
It seems likely that any easing of the restriction on 
road use will cause an over-reaction by shippers and 
an excessive switch to road. However, the retention 
of the 40 mile restriction could not be justified by 
shippers' imperfect knowledge, although it does argue 
for care in its dismantling. 
(8) It allows for market imperfections - The most 
obvious of these, and one which could form a justifi-
cation for retaining the limit, is producer monopolies. 
Since a company operating under monopoly or oligopoly 
circumstances is often able to pass on costs to the 
consumer, the financial cost of different modes 
becomes less important in modal choice decisions by 
the shipper. In general, attempts should be made to 
attack the market imperfections at their source 
rather than seeking a panacea in an all-embracing 
regulation. " 
19. The particular arguments under this head are outlined 
at pp 1-16 - 1-21, Part VII Chap 1 of the Study. 
E. Summary 
We have identified the overall purpose of policy in 
transport, mentioned the various forms of co-ordination 
and outlined the specific policies behind the rail 
restriction. As we have mentioned we have not been 
concerned to evaluate the substance of the policies. Some 
of the policy assessments made by the Transport Policy 
Study have been mentioned but as we note in the next 
section of this paper the rail restriction lives on. 
II 
III. THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF THE RAIL RESTRICTION 
We have noted that there are a number of ways of 
regulating and co-ordinating the transport of goods and 
passengers. We have also referred to the multiplicity of 
factors bearing upon transport policy and the size and 
complexity of the questions involved. 
In this section of the paper we shall consider the 
legal parameters of the restriction. In so doing we 
hope to fulfil two purposes. The first - to describe the 
nature and ambit of the parameters provided by the 
legislation. The second - to comment upon the process of 
application of the restriction; to illustrate the role 
of the courts in applying the legislation and to show the 
operation of the restriction on actual situations and 
routes. 
In very brief outline the restriction operates in the 
following way. Part VII of the Act controls road transport 
services. Virtually every conceivable journey on which 
goods might be sent within New Zealand can be accomplished 
by road. Not all journeys can be accomplished by rail -
rail routes are not as extensive as road routes. Nor is 
it always as quick, as cheap (overall), as safe, or as 
practicable to send goods by rail. Therefore it is 
generally assumed that consignors would very often prefer 
to send their goods by road rather than rail. The 
function which the rail restriction performs is that of 
preserving a certain amount of this overall traffic for 
carriage by rail. It does so by requiring (in broad terms) 
that if there is a route available for the carriage of 
goods which includes at least 40 miles of rail then all 
goods must be carried on that route rather than solely 
by road. 
A. The Statutory Framework 
The purpose of this section of the discussion is to 
outline the framework of the restrictions as found in the 
sections and regulations. We are therefore seeking to 
define the parameters of the net which catches goods 
services and subjects them to the restriction. 
The provisions of the Act which constitute this net 
are Sections 2, 108-112, and Regulation 24:-
Section 2. "Goods Service" means the carriage of 
goods for hire or reward by means of a motor 
vehicle; but, .. subject to the provisions of 
s~ctions 1097"and 114 of this Act, does not include 
the carriage of goods by the owner thereof 
(whether for hire or reward or not) by means of a 
motor vehicle:" 
"Goods" means all kinds of moveable personal property, 
including animals and mails:" 
These definitions describe the action - carriage, the 
object - goods; the means - motor vehicle (defined 
subsequently in Section 2 in broad terms), and state that 
this action must be done for hire or reward to be called a 
goods service. It is important to note that the definition 
brings almost all carriage of all goods by all motor vehicles 
within the statutory net. On the other hand it excludes 
carriage of goods by their owner while also excluding 
carriage that is not for hire or reward (the latter 
exclusion being achieved by requiring hire or reward as a 
positive element) .
1 
Thus to s.109 
Section 109. This section constitutes that part of the 
framework which broadens the net beyond the definition 
contained in s.2 to include the carriage of goods, whether 
for hire or reward or not, by heavy goods-service vehicles 
1. For further clarification of the meaning of goods-
service, and in particular carriage for hire or 
reward see the discussion at pp3-5 to 3-6 of 
Graham's Law of Transportation, P.W. Graham, Brooker 
and Friend Publishing, Wellington. See also Dixon's 
Road Traffic Laws , 5th ed. Butterworth & Co 
(New Zealand) Limited, Wellington ppl24-7 
in competition with specified lengths of open railway. As 
the "owner" exception in the s.2 definition is expressly 
subject to s.109 the latter includes carriage of goods by 
the owner of such goods. At first glance this may not 
appear significant. However, the prospect of all of 
New Zealand's major (and minor) manufacturers and producers 
being entirely free from licensing in respect of goods 
which they own (whether raw materials or finished products) 
makes it apparent that s.109 is of primary importance to 
the rail restriction and to transport licensing generally. 
The important parts of the section are:-
"(l) Subject to the provisions of this section and 
without limiting the meaning of the expression 
"goods service" in subsection (1) of section 2 of 
this Act, the carriage of any goods (whether for 
hire or reward or not) by any goods-service vehicle 
the weight of which exceeds 2,500 kilograms shall be 
deemed for the purposes of this Part of this Act to 
be a goods service within the meaning thereof, if 
there is available for their carriage -
(a) A route that includes not less than -
( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(these paragraphs outline varied lengths of rail 
in relation to various products) 
(iv) Except where paragraph (b) of this 
section applies, 40 miles of open 
Government railway in any other case:" 
(Subsection 2 contains slightly different weight and 
rail length provisions in the case of farmers) 
11 (3) The foregoing provisions of this section shall 
not apply -
(a) Where the route that includes the railway 
is longer by more than one-third than the 
shortest road route available for the 
carriage of goods; " 
In short the section deems a service to be a goods 
service if there is a route available which includes 
(generally) a minimum of 40 miles of open railway. 
Consequent upon the 1977 Budget decision the Transport 
Amendment Bill (No.2) 1977 is currently before the House. 
If passed in its present form the bill will repeal the 
present s.109 and substitute a new section raising the 
basic 40 mile limit to 150 km. The 40 mile limit constitutes 
the primary restraint on increases in the amount of goods 
which may be carried by road. The amendment more than 
doubles the 40 mile limit and will therefore provide a 
great deal more freedom for road transport operators. 
Previously a 40 mile length of rail would require carriage 
by rail · instead of road - now it must be at least 150 km. 
Paragraph (a) of subs. (3) establishes an outer limit 
on the statutory preference for rail by excluding the 
operation of the rail restriction (together with operation 
of the licensing requirements where goods are not being 
carried for hire or reward) where the preference would involve 
a route that is more than one third longer than the shortest 
road route. 
Thus ss.2 and 109 prescribe the services which are 
defined as or deemed to be goods services. (In passing it 
is worth noting that s.113 exempts certain kinds of carriage 
from licensing and that s.114 gives the Minister power to 
declare certain services for the carriage of goods to be 
goods-services within the meaning of the Act.) 
Section 108. This section states that:-
(1) Except as provided in this Part of this Act, 
it shall not be lawful for any person to carry on 
any passenger service or taxicab service or rental 
service or goods service or, within a harbour-ferry 
service district, any harbour-ferry service, other-
wise than pursuant to the authority and in conformity 
with the terms of a passenger-service licence or a 
taxicab-service licence or a rental-service licence, 
as the case may be, granted under this Part of this 
Act. 
(2) Every person commits an offence who does any act 
in any capacity as agent for any transport service that 
may be lawfully carried on only pursuant to a licence 
under this Part of this Act, if at the time of his doing 
that act such a licence is not in force in respect of 
the service. 
Clearly the purpose of s.108 is to provide for the 
licensing of goods services. When coupled with s.112 those 
licensing provisions are not without effective control. 
Nevertheless it is appropriate to cormnent on the way 
in which s.108 is drafted. Subs. (1) provides that "it 
shall not be lawful" for anyone to carry on a service 
otherwise than pursuant to, and in conformity with a 
licence. Subs. 2 states that "Every person commits an 
offence ·who does any act in any capacity as agent for a 
transport service .... " It might be said subs. (1) does 
not create an offence of carrying on a service in that it 
only provides that it shall be unlawful to carry on a 
service. This formula is in marked contrast to that used 
in subs. (2) where agents are clearly said to cormnit 
offences. At all events the courts have never questioned 
the wording, s.107 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides an 
answer in any case, and it is probably a bit difficult to 
argue that cormnitting an unlawful act under subs. (1) is 
not an offence. 2 But the difference in formulae does 
point to an apparently mindless adoption of earlier 
provisions with little regard to the context within which 
they are to function. 
Regulation 24: Given that a transport operator has to 
obtain a licence if he wishes to operate a service within 
the meaning of ss.2 or 109, Reg.24 makes the rail restriction 
a condition of the licence -
"unless the licence expressly states that the 
restriction shall not apply or shall be modified, 
namely: 
Restriction 
If there is an available route for the carriage of 
goods which includes at least 40 miles of open 
Government railway, or in the case of logs the 
Murupara-Kawerau Railway, or, in the case of goods 
2. See also s.112(a) which refers to "an offence of 
carrying on a goods-service" 
lb 
of the classes described in subclause (2) hereof, 
such other length of open Government railway as is 
specified therein, goods shall be carried only as 
far as is necessary to permit of their carriage by 
railway. 
( 2 ) ••••• 
( 3) The 
apply -
(a) 
(b) 
provisions of this regulation shall not 
Where the route that includes the railway 
is longer by more than one third than the 
shortest road route available for the 
carriage of the goods: 
Where the goods are carried on a route or 
between terminal points as expressly 
authorised in the licence: .... " 
The implication contained in para (3) (b) is that a 
point to point or route licence for a route which is 
subject to the restriction contains an exemption from the 
. . 3 restriction. 
This regulation will shortly be amended to conform to 
the new 150 km limit announced in the budget. We understand 
from the Ministry of Transport that the regulation is being 
drafted to effect the change in much the same way as the 
amendment to s.109. 
The substance of the grounds on which applications 
for exemptions from Reg.24 are made, together with the way 
in which the Licensing Authority and Licensing Appeal 
Authority determine such applications, are b riefly considered in 
Part IV of this paper. However, regard should be had for 
two important aspects of the exemptions to the legal 
parameters: first, the exemption mechanism constitutes 
part of the legal parameters of the rail restriction in 
the sense that it sets limits on the situations in which 
an exemption will be granted; secondly, the exemption 
mechanism is a different kind of parameter than those 
discussed thus far - it provides a relatively flexible 
3. It is perhaps worth noting again the insertion of the 
outer limit on the preference for rail - that it not 
demand a route that is more than one third longer 
than the shortest road route. 
decision making process rather than the simple statement 
of fixed rules covering defined situations. 
Section 111 This section prohibits circumvention of 
the restriction by the use of linked-up services. The 
mischief which it seeks to prevent is the carriage of goods 
by a series of stages, each one of which does not infringe 
the restriction but which, when added together, constitute 
an infringement. 
The Section provides: 
(1) Where -
(a) In the course of the carriage of goods the goods 
are carried in stages from one place to another 
by 1 or more persons; and 
(b) The total carriage of those goods between those 
places by any one of those persons would have 
been unlawful by reason of section 109 of this 
Act or of any regulations made or continuing and 
having effect under this Act (being regulations 
relating to the carriage of goods by road where 
there is an available route for the carriage of 
goods by road where there is an available route 
for the carriage of goods that includes not less 
than a specified length of open Government 
railway), -
every person who carries the goods over any one of those 
stages or is a party to that carriage shall, subject to 
the provisions of this section, be deemed to have 
carried on a goods service over the whole of the route over 
which the goods are carried. 
(2) This section shall apply notwithstanding that but 
for this section the carriage of the goods by road over 
each of the said stages may have been lawful. 
These provisions raise several problems which could 
be explored further. The approach of this paper has involved 
the selection of certain areas for detailed analysis. 
Evaluation of s.111 showed that the concept of "available 
route" contained a greater range of interesting material. 
Therefore, a detailed analysis of s.111 will not be 
proceeded with. 
Having considered the major parts of the 'net' 
provided by the parameters of the restriction we now come 
to the concept of an "available route" 
B. The Concept of an "Available Route". 
We have seen that the substance of the restriction 
lies in s.109 and Reg.24 and that these provisions set the 
restriction into operation where there is an "available 
route" which includes a minimum specified length of 
railway. Section 110 defines an "available route" and 
is crucial to any understanding of the parameters of the 
rail restriction. 
Section 110 is in the following terms:-
11110. "Available route" defined - (1) For the 
purposes of section 109 of this Act and of any regulations 
made or continuing and having effect under this Act (being 
regulations relating to the carriage of goods by road 
if there is available for their carriage a route that 
includes not less than a specified length of open 
Government railway) the following provisions of this 
subsection shall apply: 
(a) A route which includes not less than the specified 
length of open Government railway or, in the case 
of logs, includes the Murupara-Kawerau Railway 
shall be deemed to be available for the carriage 
of the goods, notwithstanding that in order to 
permit of their carriage by the railway part of 
the route it is necessary to carry the goods by 
road at either end or both ends of the railway 
part, whether in any direction or for any distance: 
(b) The length of the railway shall be computed 
according to the distance between places as set out 
in the Government Railways working timetables, 
which places shall be deemed to include all 
railways sidings in the vicinity thereof. 
L-(2) For the purposes of section 109 of this Act and 
of any regulations made or continuing and having effect 
under this Act (being regulations relating to the 
carriage of goods by road if there is a route available 
for their carriage that includes not less than a 
specified length of open Government railway), where a 
route that includes not less than the specified length 
of open Government railway is available for the 
carriage of goods, then, subject to subsections (2A) 
and (2B) of this section, any part of the railway 
portion of that route that is not less than that 
specified length shall also be deemed to be part of a 
route available for the carriage of goods, whether or 
not the stations at the terminal points of that part 
are the railway stations nearest to the place where the 
carriage of the goods (whether by rail or by road if 
19 
the carriage is to be by rail and road combined) 
actually commences or ends, and whether or not, if 
the goods were carried by rail, their carriage would 
normally begin or end at some other railway station. 
(2A) Where a route is available as aforesaid, a 
length of railway shall be deemed not to be part of 
that route if the distance by rail between the nearest 
railway station on that length to the place where the 
carriage of the goods begins and the nearest railway 
station on that length to the place where their 
carriage ends is less than the length so specified. 
(2B) Where pursuant to subsection (2) of this section 
part of the railway portion of a route is also deemed 
to be part of a route available for the carriage of 
goods, the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of 
section 109 of this Act and of any such regulations as 
aforesaid shall not apply where that last-mentioned 
route is longer by more than one-third than the shortest 
road route available for the carriage of the goods~/ 
(3) For the purposes of any proceedings for an 
offence under this Part of this Act or under any such 
regulations, being an offence relating to the carriage 
of goods by road where there is an available route for 
the carriage of goods that includes not less than a 
specified length of open Government railway, the road 
route over which the goods were actually carried shall 
be deemed to be the shortest road route available for 
their carriage." 
It is evident that the function of these provisions 
is to describe the circumstances in which a route is 
available, to prescribe the means of selection of routes 
for computation under the restriction and to lay down the 
rules by which the length of such routes is to be reckoned. 
While it describes some of the circumstances in which a 
route is or is not, available, s.110 does not specifically 
deal with the meaning of the word "available". Thus this 
initial definitional question has been put to the courts 
on numerous occasions. Therefore discussion of this 
provision will be broken into two parts: 
(a) The meaning of 'available' in s.110 
(b) The substance of s.110. 
(a) The meaning of available in s.110. 
First, the courts have made it very clear that the 
question of whether or not a route is available is always 
a question of fact in the particular case. 4 However it is 
equally clear that the courts have the task of interpreting 
the statutory language and deciding upon the meaning of the 
word 'available'. 
Second~y, the frequency of the service operated along 
the rail route in question will not normally be a factor 
to be taken into account in deciding whether the route is 
available - Dobbin v West Otago Transport Ltd 5 Donovan v 
Cockburn. 
6 
In Dobbin's case there were two grounds on which 
infrequency of service did not constitute lack of an available 
route: first, the timetable was only unsuitable to the 
particular consignor; secondly, the extent of the unsuitability 
was only minimal in that it only prevented him from taking 
advantage of a limited and unusual market. Henry J. did 
not specifically separate these two elements however it is 
suggested that they go to different points and have different 
consequences. Donovan v Cockburn involved inconvenience 
to a larger group of persons. The service in question ran 
only once every twenty-four hours to the town in question 
and then only at night. However, Woodhouse J. drew a clear 
distinction between availability of the route and the 
provision of a service which suited the convenience of 
individuals. He had no hesitation in saying that this case 
fell into the latter of the two categories. In both cases 
it was observed that at some stage infrequency of service 
might mean that a route would not be 'available' and that 
the restriction would not apply. These observations 
introduce a theme which will be taken up more fully in the 
immediately succeeding paragraphs. 
4. e.g. Transport Ministry v Vibra:eac Ltd {197}/ 1 
NZLR 500 per Turner p at p504; 
Donovan v ATW Transport Limited {196}/ NZLR 88, 91 
5. {1961:_/ NZLR 295 
6 . {196}/ NZLR 322. 
The third consideration which we shall examine in 
discussing when a route is available concerns the influence 
of economic factors, difficulties in loading the goods 
concerned and inconvenience caused by use of the rail. A 
relatively clear line of authority flowed from the decision 
of Finlay J. in Hanna v Garland 7 to the effect that such 
factors should not be taken into account when determining 
the availability of a route. Yet two subsequent decisions 
have pointed ·to the possibility that such factors might 
go to availability. We shall be concerned to see when and 
why this might be so. 
Counsel for the defendant in Hanna v Garland contended 
that the word 'available' meant "reasonably available" and 
that the route in question was not capable of economic use 
because it involved a multiplicity of handlings. The 
thrust of the submission was that economic factors are 
relevant to the meaning of 'available'. 
submission Finlay J. said: 
In rejecting this 
"Consideration convinces me that the word 'available' 
as used in s.96 inherently means 'capable of use in fact' 
or 'open and usable'. It is to the characteristic of 
the road from the point of view of fitness for use that 
the word 'reasonably', if introduced, would relate. 
In other words, I am not disposed to think that the 
word 'available' in the subsection has any relation 
to the economic incidents of user of a road. If this 
were not so, then whether routes were available or 
not might have to be determined in the light of questions 
of extra cost involved in their use by reason of their 
steepness or other characteristics involving increased 
running costs. Nothing of that sort was, I am 
satisfied, intended by the legislature which, when it 
used the word 'available8, meant no more than 'susceptible of use'. " 
Two points can be made about this decision. First, 
the finding of the court as to the meaning of 'available' 
under s.96 of the Transport Act 1949 is not invalidated by 
any changes in the 1962 Act. 
7. L195!/ NZLR 945 
8. Supra, p.947 
Secondly, this statement has been approved in all the 
subsequent decisions and forms the basis of a clear line of 
authority on this point. 9 It is also worth noting that it 
has formed a clear bar to the defendant in these cases and 
no case has yet been won on the basis of economic factors 
alone. The test has therefore become that of whether the 
route is open or capable of use in fact. Even so, this 
question leaves room for doubt about the factors which go 
to availability. The doubts are raised in two cases -
10 Mcvicar Timber Ltd v Transport Deoartment and Transport 
Ministry v Vibrapac (Southland) Limited. 11 
In McVicar's case the court was concerned to see whether 
the fact that particular goods might not be able to be 
handled and loaded at a railway station at one end of the 
rail part of a route meant that that route was not available. 
The evidence clearly showed that the particular logs being 
carried on the day in question could have been loaded onto 
rail wagons at the station in question. Therefore Macarthur J. 
found that the route was in fact open and usable in respect 
of that load notwithstanding some extra costs and inconven-
ience to defendant. But he also approved of the concession 
made by counsel for the Transport Department that "under 
certain circumstances a particular railway station may not 
be 'open and usable', for example because of the peculiar 
nature and loading requirements of certain goods " 12 
A similar situation arose in the Vibrapac case where 
the defendant submitted that the lack of facilities at a 
station by which two ton pallets of concrete blocks might 
be transferred from trucks to railway wagons meant that 
the station was not available and accordingly that the route 
9. Birrell v Dugdale L126!/ NZLR 433, Donovan v Knight & 
Dickey Limited L196~/ N~LR 29, Mcvicar Timber Ltd v 
Transport Department L1962/ NZLR 694, _ _ 
Colville Transport Limited v Transport Department L197l/ 
NZLR 606,_ Transport Ministry v Vibrapac (Southland) 
Limited L197l/ 1 NZLR 500. 
10. Supra. 
11. Supra. 
12. Supra p.696 
was not available. The case was disposed of by the Court 
of Appeal on the basis that there was a crane capable of 
lifting the pallets on the back of the very truck which was 
used to take the blocks to the station in question. 
However, all three judges made observations as to the test 
for availability and the line of authority stemming from 
Hanna v Garland. These observations were occasioned by 
the fact that in the Supreme Court White J. had decided 
that the route was not available as the Railways Department 
had not provided loading facilities at the particular 
station - even though the Railways Department had no 
obligation to supply loading facilities. White J. felt 
that the fact that the defendent was able to arrange 
loading at that point made no difference. In light of the 
fact that the Department is not obliged to provide loading 
facilities the ultimate effect of White J's decision was to 
say that inconvenience and cost to the defendant in 
arranging loading meant that the route was not available. 
Hence the issue faced by the Court of Appeal was quite 
directly that of the effect of economic and other such 
factors upon the question of availability. 
Wild C.J. outlined the "settled line of authority" 13 
flowing from ~anna v Garland and stated that against that 
"the concession approved on the facts of McVicar's case, 
which was the foundation of White J's judgment in the present 
case, should not be taken as of general application." 14 
He went on to say that the question of availability is a 
question of fact in each case and - "Depending on the 
circumstances the extent of loading facilities at railway 
stations on the route may have a bearing on the determination 
of that question /i.e. availability/ 1115 
Turner P. felt that the case before him was not 
completely covered by what was said in Hanna v Garland. 
He stated his agreement with the view that factors of 
13. ibid p.502 
14. ibid 
15. ibid p.503 
convenience, efficiency and cost are not to be taken into 
account yet also approved the approach of Henry J. in 
Dobbin's case (in relation to frequency of services). He 
went on to say: 
"I am of the opinion that the decision of Finlay J. 
in Hanna v Garland (supra) and those of this 
Court in Donovan v Knight & Dickey Ltd (supra)_and_ 
Colville Transport Ltd v Transport Department L197l/ 
NZLR 606, still leave open in every case the question 
as to whether it is reasonably practicable to use the 
railway route which the Department offers. Mere 
economic disadvantage will not lead to the conclusion 
that the railway route is not available; but I wish 
to guard myself against the proposition that, in viewing 
the question, as I view it, always as one of fact and 
degree, economic considerations may not in a give~ 
case accumulate to ' the point where it may be held that 
the route is no longer rrtsonably available as a 
practical proposition." 
(emphases added) 
In similar vein Richmond J. agreed that at a certain 
point the absence of any loading facilities could mean that 
the route was no longer available. He too agreed with 
Henry J's approach in Dobbin. He also referred to his own 
judgment in Colville in which he had left open the 
question of the effect of a complete lack of means of 
carrying the goods by the road portion of a composite road-
rail route. 
The question which we must now decide is that of where 
this leaves us. 
The authorities clearly establish that the test for the 
meaning of the word 'available' is whether the route is open 
and usable in fact. It is equally certain that in 
determining this question the court will refuse to take into 
account mere inconvenience and the particular requirements of 
. d' 'd 1 . 17 an in ivi ua consignor. 
16. supra, p.505 
17. Dobbin v West Otago Transport Ltd (supra) 
Colville Transport Limited v Transport Department 
( supra) . 
Nor will the court regard economic considerations, 
difficulties in loading and infrequency of services as 
relevant unless their presence in a particular case means 
that the route cannot be considered open and usable. 
However, it must be remembered that this proposition is not 
firmly established as there is no case in which a route 
has been held to be unavailable for this reason. On the 
other hand there is dicta to this effect over 12 years and 
5 cases, one of which contained firm indications to this 
end from all three judges of the Court of Appeal. The 
point can also be made that in none of the cases in which the 
court refused to take account of these factors did these 
considerations appear to. be present to a very significant 
degree and thereby call upon the court to answer an acute 
form of the question. The argument is therefore open that 
th · · d 18 d . . h . f e point is not yet covere . In ications are tat i 
the more acute case does arise a court would be prepared 
to say that a route is unavailable on the basis of one 
or more of these factors. 
But the question still remains as to when this might be. 
All of the judges who have discussed this point frame their 
observations in terms of the degree or extent to which one 
of these factors is present. Some are more clear about this 
point than others. 19 · However, all envisage an accumulation 
of such a factor to such a point, or stage, that the route 
is no longer open or usable. It might be argued that this 
is a difference in kind rather than degree in that it 
then goes to the question of whether the route is open or 
not. Two points may be made in rebuttal of this contention. 
One, the basic test is clearly 'open and usable' and 
therefore the factor (economic loading or frequency of 
service) is measured against this stick from the ground 
upwards i.e. from inconvenience upwards. A difference in 
18. e.g. Turner P. in Vibrapac, (supra) p.503 lines 46-47 
19. e.g. Turner P. in Vibrapac (supra) p.505 
kind cannot be found here - the differences in degree of 
presence of the factor are measured against the same 
standard all the time. The other argument in favour of a 
difference of degree rather than kind is this. The difference 
in kind which results when a factor accumulates to a point 
where a route is said to be no longer open goes only to the 
consequence of the factor and not to the factor itself. 
The route which was open becomes not open - a consequence 
only. The presence of the factor remains a matter of degree. 
We might well ask at this point whether application of 
these factors would represent a departure from the view 
expressed in Hanna v Garland. In so far as economic incid-
ents of user are applied ·the answer must be yes. Finlay J. 
did not appear to be admitting the possibility that 
economic considerations could be relevant at all. Therefore 
a difference in degree of presence would make no difference. 
Application of loading and service frequency considerations 
would probably fall within the scope of Finlay J's analysis 
only to the extent that they went to the physical 
characteristics of the route. 
However, assuming that economic, loading and service 
considerations may be applied by the courts, when are they 
present to a sufficient degree to establish a case that a 
route is not open and usable? The judicial observations 
contain no clearly worked out indication of when this might 
be. Notwithstanding this it is probably safe to say that 
if it is clearly impossible to use the route by virtue of 
one of the factors then the route will not be considered 
usable. In the Vibrapac case Turner P. suggested that 
it is enough that it be simply in relation to the goods 
involved in the particular case. Support for this view 
can also be found in McVicar's case. In regard to this 
point it may be that the difference in wording of s.109 
and Reg.24 introduces a distinction between situations under 
s.109 and situations under Reg.24. Section 109 refers to 
the "carriage of any goods" and a route "available for their 
carriage" whilst Reg. 24 refers to "an available route for 
the carriage of goods"!_ It is possible to argue that under 
s.109 the decision is left to the court in relation to 
the particular goods while Reg. 24 puts the decision as to 
the particular goods a stage further back into the hands of 
the Licensing Authority and its decision as to the terms of 
the license and the grant of an exemption from Reg. 24~/ 
However, if the loading consideration is to make any sense 
at all then it will have to be in relation to the particular 
goods in question. 
At the other end of the scale it is clear that mere 
inconvenience caused by one of the factors will not be 
enough to affect the route's availability. But the 
difficult problem is in the middle of the scale, particularly 
the high end of the middle. One might well ask what the 
standard will be. 
It will not be enough to simply say that when the factor 
shows that the route is no longer capable of use it is 
present to a sufficient degree. Such a proposition begs the 
question in cases to which the answer is not clearly yes 
or no. Turner P. in Vibrapac provided two examples of 
when a route might not be available - if the goods were in 
the form of irreducible unitary loads, or if there had been 
no crane available in that region. The second of these two 
examples raises the more difficult point: supposing a crane 
is available but is 100 miles away, or 200 miles, or 300 
miles, or 60 miles - when can it be said that loading and 
economic factors go to availability? Turner P. suggested 
that the test was "whether it is reasonably practicable to 
use the railway route which the Department offers.'' 20 
Tests of reasonableness are well known for their potential 
uncertainty - especially in the initial stages of develop-
ment of such a test. However they do have the advantage 
of flexibility of reasoning and result. Given that the 
'available route' question forms only a small (albeit 
significant) part of the statutory net it may not be 
unreasonable for the legislature to live with this uncertainty. 
20. Vibrapac p.505 
In many ways this in turn would depend on the courts' 
ability to retain their fairly cautious and restrictive view 
of the tests for ascertaining availability. 
For this reason it may be appropriate for the courts 
to move towards a rather more overtly 'exceptional' test. 
By this we mean a test that emphasises the special 
circumstances of the case - circumstances which make the 
carriage of these goods in the particular circumstances 
different from the carriage of other goods. Given that the 
function of the courts in looking at the statute is to 
interpret and apply the provisions of the Act, and assuming 
that the word 'available' does indeed pose difficult 
questions then a primary aim of the judicial function should 
be to promote fairness and equality of treatment of those 
subject to the Act. Therefore it is submitted that 
it is appropriate that the courts do engage in the limited 
comparative task suggested above. 
Three points emerge from the foregoing consideration 
of availability: 
(i) It lies in an important area and has attracted 
a significant amount of judicial attention 
(ii) The line of authority is not entirely clear or 
consistent, certainly its future direction leaves room for 
discussion. An attempt has been made to outline the law 
on this point, point to its difficulties and speculate thereon. 
(iii) It illustrates in rather a neat fashion the 
role of the judiciary in the area of transport licensing. 
Furthermore it points to some of the difficulties of co-
ordinating and controlling transport by means of rules and 
restrictions. (However, that is not to say that the criticism 
is necessarily fatal.) The legislative provisions outline 
the framework of a restriction which regulates the 
substance of a very significant area of transport policy. 
We have seen that even a definitional question is likely 
to call upon the courts to decide the substance of transport 
policy. Economic, loading and service considerations 
directly concern transport efficiency. Thus far the courts 
have not been faced with a difficult question. But they 
have been deciding these questions; so far the answer has 
always been yes, the route is available. However the 
possibility that it might not be available seems to loom 
large. The lines which have been drawn and which will be 
drawn appear uncertain and possibly arbitrary. The import 
of the questions is certainly large, albeit in relation 
to a small area. It might be that the task which the 
legislature is asking the deciding bodies to do is too 
difficult, it may be that it would be better to have a 
rather less detailed way of regulating transport activity. 
These questions will be taken up again in the closing part 
of this section and in the ne x t section. 
(b) The substance of s.110 
Certain parts of this section are relatively clear. 
Other parts are extraordinarily difficult to understand. 
First, the parts which are reasonably straight 
forward: 
(i) Subsection (1) (a) provides that a route 
including a length of rail specified in the restriction 
(hereafter '40 miles' - for convenience and clarity) 
is deemed to be an available route notwithstanding the fact 
that the goods have to be carried by road at either or both 
ends of the railway part of the route, whether for any 
distance or in any direction. This provision is self-
explanatory. It was inserted to meet objections that such 
deviations meant that a route was no longer available. 
(ii) An outer limit on the length of journey which 
might be demanded by the rail restriction is provided by 
subs. (2B). In the interests of overall transport efficiency 
this subsection provides that the restriction does not 
operate if it would require a journey by the composite rail-
road route that is more than one-third longer than the 
shortest road route. As the purpose of s.110 is merely to 
serve s.109 and Reg.24, both of which contain this outer 
limit, one wonders at the necessity for including this 
provision here. It seems to be an unwarranted duplication. 
Nevertheless this limit should be borne in mind throughout 
our discussion of these provisions. 
(iii) The length of the railway portion of a 
potentially available route is to be measured by the 
Government Railways timetable - subsection (1) (b) 
Subsections (2) and (2A) 
The search for the meaning of these subsections raises 
some very difficult questions indeed. These two subsections 
must also be read with subs. (2B) however as we have mentioned 
that provision does not cause much difficulty. All three 
provisions were substituted for the original subs. (2)by s~lO of 
the Transport Amendment Act 1965. We wish to outline 
the pattern of events leading to the 1965 amendment and to 
then attempt to explain the provisions. 
The original subs. (2) of s.110 of the 1962 Act 
read as follows: 
"(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) of 
this section, the provisions of section 109 of this 
Act and of any regulations made or continuing and 
having effect under this Act (being regulations 
relating to the carriage of goods by road if there is 
a route available for their carriage that includes not 
less than a specified length of open Government 
railway) shall not apply where the length of the 
railway from the railway station nearest to the place 
where their carriage begins to the railway station 
nearest to the place where their carriage ends is less 
than is specified in relation to their carriage by that 
section or by those regulations. " 
It is important to note that the subsection used the 
nearest railway stations to where the carriage began and 
ended as the points by which to measure the rail length. 
Thus if goods were being shipped from a factory which was 
5 miles from railway station A and 6 miles from railway 
station B, subs.(2) required that railway station A be 
used as one terminal point of the length of measured railway. 
A reasonably common-sense approach one would think (a point 
to which we shall return). 
In Donovan v Knight & Dickey Ltd 21 the Court of 
Appeal was faced with a question upon which subs. (2) was 
silent. In that case there were two rail routes between 
the same two 'nearest' stations. One route was under 40 
miles, the other was over 40 miles. Naturally a choice of 
the shorter route would have meant that the restriction did 
not operate, choosing the longer would have meant that it 
did. By a majority of 2 to 1 the court chose the shorter 
route. In doing so the majority referred to a "common-
sense" approach to the question. In addition North P. 
referred to the 40 mile limit as a compromise between 
opposing interests. It is worth noting his approach to the 
choice; he felt that it would be "contrary to the spirit 
of the Act to give the Railway Department this advantage" -
namely, of nominating the longer route and in fact using the 
shorter of the two. 
A similar observation - but in much stronger terms -
22 was made by Woodhouse J. in Transport Department v Paterson 
That case centred around the problem of selection of one 
of several rail lengths and accordingly, composite road-rail 
routes which in turn depended on selection of the 
appropriate terminal point (only the finishing terminal 
point was in issue here.) Counsel for the Railway Department 
put forward an argument that appeared to require: 
(i) the selection of a fictional terminal point 
that was not the station nearest to the final destination 
of the goods. Woodhouse J. called it a 'fictional' point 
because it would not in fact be used. The terminal point 
which would in fact be used, if the goods were carried by 
rail, and which was the 'nearest' station involved a route 
which was longer by more than one-third than the shortest 
21. (supra) 
22. /1966/ NZLR 62. Although reported in 1966 the decision 
was handed down in August 1965. It seems that the 1965 
amendment is the statutory rejoinder to this case: 
Graham's Law of Transoortation (supra) p.12-16, 
Dixon - Road Traffic Laws (supra) p.132 fn. (oa) 
road route. Regulation 24(3) (a) (which is in the same 
terms as the new subs. (2B)) explicitly states that such 
a route operates to exclude the rail restriction and thus 
the Railway Department could not say that this route was an 
available route. 
The argument then required the Court to: 
(ii) for the purposes of the 'nearest' station rule 
discard the fictional terminal point and assume the real 
terminal point - which was in fact 'nearest' 
while all the while 
(iii) for the purposes of the one-third rule retaining 
the fictional terminal point mentioned in (i) 
The tautology is obvious. 
Woodhouse J. made short work of this argument. His 
comments highlight the debate between the legislature and 
the judiciary as well as illustrating the import 
of the 1965 amendments: 
"Despite the interest created by these exchanges, I 
managed to recall, as they were developed before me, 
that they were related to the movement of real loads 
of timber ..... This is an Act designed to regulate 
the carriage of real goods over real journeys. It 
cannot have been intended that the legitimate claims 
of the Railways Department should suddenly be enlarged 
by the random introduction of railway stations quite 
unrelated to the 'available route' chosen by it; and 
I so hold ....... I prefer to be guided by_the 
principal expressly relied on by North P. /in Donovan 
v Knight & Dickey Ltd/ to the general effect that a 
strictly literal application of these sections should 
be tested against the spirit of the enactment. In 
my opinion s.110 (2) ) was not intended to give to the 
Railways Department the arbitrary and capricious 
selection~~ data which the submissions before me claim 
for it. " 
23. ibid pp 63-64 
Thus, in applying the nearest station rule he looked 
strictly at the actual points at which the carriage began 
and ended, the actual routes over which the goods would be 
carried, thereby refusing the Railways Department the 
right of selection of random, notional (or fictional) 
stations and routes. 
Amendment of subsection (2) followed immediately. 
The new subsections (2) and (2A) have not yet been the 
subject of comprehensive judicial scrutiny. Therefore the 
task is that of direct interpretation of the provisions. 
As noted before subss. (2) and (2A) provide: 
"/-(2) For the purposes of section 109 of this Act and 
of any regulations made or continuing and having effect 
under this Act (being regulations relating to the 
carriage of goods by road if there is a route available 
for their carriage that includes not less than a 
specified length of open Government railway), where a 
route that includes not less than the specified length 
of open Government railway is available for the 
carriage of goods, then, subject to subsections (2A) 
and (2B) of this section, any part of the railway portion 
if that route that is not less than that specified length 
shall also be deemed to be part of a route available for 
the carriage of goods, whether or not the stations at 
the terminal points of that part are the railway stations 
nearest to the place where the carriage of the goods 
(whether by rail or by road if the carriage is to be by 
rail and road combined) actually commences or ends, and 
whether or not, if the goods were carried by rail, their 
carriage would normally begin or end at some other 
railway station. 
(2A) Where a route is available as aforesaid, a length 
of railway shall be deemed not to be part of that route 
if the distance by rail between the nearest railway 
station on that length to the place where the carriage 
of the goods begins and the nearest railway station on 
that length to the place where thei~ carriage ends is 
less than the length so specified._/" 
These provisions appear to defy comprehension. Unless 
the intention was to confuse, and that is hardly a tenable 
proposition, one must conclude that they are very poorly 
drafted. 
Subsection (2) may be broken down into the following 
structure (which contains several abbreviations, additions 
and deletions to highlight and explain certain features): 
1. For the purposes of s.109 (and Reg.24) 
2. Where a route (of 40 miles or more) is available 
3. Then (subject to (2A) and (2B) 
4. Any part of the railway portion of that route 
(i.e. the route mentioned above with more than 40 miles of 
railway) that is not less than (40 miles) 
5. shall also be deemed to be a part of an available 
route 
6. whether or not the stations at the terminal points 
of that part are the nearest stations to the place (i.e. 
original starting point and destination - whether by rail 
or road/rail) where the carriage of the goods actually 
commences or ends and, 
whether or not if the goods were carried by rail 
their carriage would normally begin or end at some other 
station 
The effect of this subsection is to deem any part of 
the railway part of an available route that is 40 miles 
or more to be a part of an available route in spite of the 
fact that the stations at each end of that length of rail 
are not the nearest stations and in spite of the fact 
that if the goods were carried by rail their carriage 
would normally begin and end at other stations. 
So far so good. The effect of the provision is to 
allow random selection of stations that are not the nearest 
stations. Thus the 40 mile rail length can be moved up and 
down the whole length of rail available and found at any 
point (provided of course it does not call for a route which 
infringes the one-third rule). It also allows the Railway 
Department to insist on a particular length of rail as 
the rail part of the available route even though a longer 
or different rail length would in fact be used. Thus the 
two propositions in Paterson fall to the ground. 
However we now have to consider the effect of subs. (2A). 
Broken down into its various parts subs. (2A) provides: 
1. Where a route is available as aforesaid (i.e. 
having found a route with (say) 40 miles or more of rail 
in it under subsection (2) ) 
2. a length of railway shall be deemed not to be 
part of that route 
if 
3. the distance by rail between the nearest railway 
station on that length to the place where the carriage of the 
goods begins and the nearest railway station on that length 
to the place where the carriage ends is less than (say) 40 
miles 
To repeat part of the wording of the subsection, its 
effect is that "a length of railway" is "deemed not to be 
part" of the route found available under the whole of subs. 
(2) if the distance between the nearest station "on that 
length" to where (total) carriage of the goods begins and 
the nearest station "on that length" to where carriage ends 
is less than 40 miles. An easy point can be disposed of 
quickly. If there are two rail lengths available, 
depending on the circumstances one might be cut out under 
subs. (2A) (if it contains less than 40 miles between 
nearest stations) and the longer route might remain under 
subs. (2). 
However the difficult question is that in regard to 
a route with only one rail route in it. We must consider 
which "length of railway" is deemed not to be a part of 
the route under subs. (2A). There are two alternatives; 
the whole length of the railway found available under 
subs. (2), or the under-40-mile length between the nearest 
stations. Under the latter of these two alternatives there 
may still be an available rail length comprising the whole 
length found under subs. (2) minus the under-40-mile 
length. The first of these alternatives seems to be the 
correct one. The distance to be measured is that between 
the nearest stations "on that length". In their ordinary 
meaning these words appear to refer to a length that is 
longer than the distance between the two stations. The 
stations simply have to be on that length and it is that 
length which is deemed not to be part of an available route. 
Furthermore this wording is in marked contrast to that 
adopted in subs. (2) where the stations concerned are 
explicitly referred to as "at the terminal points of that 
part". One might therefore support the natural 
construction with the argument that if the legislature had 
intended the stations in subs. (2A) to be terminal points 
stations it would have expressly said so. An even stronger 
indication that this is indeed the case is provided by the 
relationship between the two subsections: subs. (2) 
subject to subs. (2A) - provides that a length will be 
counted as part of an available route whether or not the 
stations at the terminal points of that route are the 
nearest stations; subs. (2A) provides a counter and a 
safeguard to that random selection by providing that never-
theless that length will be deemed not to be part of an 
available route if in fact the distance between the stations 
nearest the commencement and ending of the carriage of the 
goods is less than 40 miles. 
In this way the problem of the conflicting approaches 
in the two subsections to the nearest station principle is 
solved. The approaches do in fact conflict and accordingly 
the second approach operates as a limit on the first. 
Subsection (2A) limits, rather than totally conflicts with 
subs. (2) because lengths of rail deemed to be part of a 
route under subs. (2) will not always be struck down by 
subs. (2A) e.g. Paterson, where the distance between the 
two nearest stations was more than 40 miles but where the 
Railway Department had to nominate a not-nearest terminal 
point because that distance infringed the one-third rule. 
Under subs. (2) that fictional nomination can now be made 
and it will not be struck down by subs. (2A). 
The desirability of this capacity to nominate fictional 
not-nearest terminal points is another question altogether. 
One wonders how this will aid overall transport efficiency. 
The rail restriction was originally circumscribed by real 
limits. The licensing provisions of the Act were designed 
to regulate transport efficiency by a comparison of real 
alternatives - in this case carriage of goods by road or 
by rail. To reject the comparison of real routes seems 
to run counter ·to the object of the Act. It also creates 
real anomalies, obfuscates the task of those who administer 
the Act and obscures the policy behind the restriction. 
Some of these points are instanced by the two latest 
reported decisions on s.110. Our aim is to discuss these 
cases by way of examples of the operation of the restriction -
thus concluding the substantive discussion of s.110 and the 
chronology of its course. 
Transport Department 24 v Reeves Transport Ltd 
This decision is an example of the way in which one of 
two possible rail lengths is selected under s.110. The 
defendant was charged (presumably under s.108(1) with the 
offence of carrying goods otherwise than in conformity with 
the terms of its licence. The term of the license which 
was at issue was of course Reg.24. The central issue was 
whether there was an available route so that Reg.24 could 
be said to apply in this case. It was clear that if the 
restriction did apply the defendant had contravened it by 
carrying the goods by road. There were two possible 
24. L197~/ NZLR 155 
composite road-rail routes, one brought the restriction into 
operation, the other did not. The question was which route 
was selected by s.110. 
The composite road-rail routes and the road route are 
outlined in Diagram One. 
Diagram One 
1. Road Route - Pourere - Ahuriri (61 miles) 
2. Composite road-rail routes. (These routes initially 
follow the same road but then diverge). 
Pourere - (starting point) 
l 
Road junction 
Otane railway station 
(further than Waipawa 
railway station from 
Pourere but nearer to 
final destination than 
Waipawa i.e. goods not 
required to travel in 
opposite direction to 
overall direction) 
(by rail) 
rail length= 
37 miles 
road~ 
Ahuriri railway station 
(i.e. final destination) 
Waipawa railway station 
(nearer than Otane railway 
station to Pourere by 1 
mile but required goods to 
travel in opposite direction 
to overall direction of 
travel) 
(by rail) 
rail length= 
40 miles 
Ahuriri railway station 
(i.e. final destination) 
Neither of the two composite road-rail lengths were 
ruled out by the one-third rule. However the prosecution 
would have failed if the Pourere-Otane-Ahuriri route was 
the route to be applied in determining whether there was 
an available route; the length of rail on this route was 
too short (37 miles) to set the restriction into operation : 
but this was not the route selected by s.110. 
Beattie J. determined that the Pourere-Waipawa-Ahuriri 
route was the relevant route under s.110. There were two 
reasons for this choice. First, this route was deemed to 
be available under s.110 (i) (a) as it included more than 
40 miles of rail - and that paragraph provides that it is 
irrelevant that the goods have to travel by road in the 
wrong direction (or for any distance) to get to the 
station. (As noted in the report the one-third rule is 
the outer limit on the distance involved.) Secondly, 
because Waipawa and Ahuriri were the nearest stations to the 
commencement and end of the overall journey and because 
there was not less than 40 miles of rail between them, the 
rail length was not ruled out by subs. (2A). In this 
case subs. (2) did not need to be used as the length of 
rail was clearly brought in under subs. (1) (a). Hence 
there was an available route, the restriction did apply 
d h t . d d 24a an t e prosecu ion succee e . 
Colville Transport Ltd 25 v Transport Department 
This decision illustrates rather different aspects 
of the available route concept. The defendant was convicted 
in the Magistrate's Court under s.108 of operating a 
service otherwise than in conformity with its licence -
namely carrying goods by road in contravention of Reg. 24. 
The case was taken to the Supreme Court on appeal and thence 
to the Court of Appeal where the conviction was re-instated. 
Before outlining the substance of the decision it is 
worth noting that almost the whole of the judgrnent delivered 
24a. Before leaving this case it is worth mentioning the reference by counsel for the defendant to the constant amendments to the legislation to nullify various 
judicial interpretations of the available route 
concept. Counsel also noted that his client had used the road route for many years in the belief that he was not infringing the restriction. It is interesting to 
speculate how many other persons operate under a 
similar misapprehension. 
25. L197!/ NZLR 606 
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by North P. consitiutes a criticism of the past history 
and present state of s.110. The comments which he offered 
are interesting in their own right and as pointers to the 
actual and perceived role of the judiciary vis a vis the 
legislation. The substance of his criticism was that 
measured against the spirit and intention of the Act, 
the amendments to s.110 left him with the 'uneasy feeling' 
that the Railway's preference had been pushed too far. 
This comment was primarily directed at the current fictional 
character of the section - by virtue of which goods appear 
to be carried by rail over routes which are more than one-
third longer than the shortest road route. Consequently 
he was of the opinion that the amendments were probably a 
reflection of the views of officials of the Railway 
Department rather than those of Parliament. 
The making of these comments shows a willingness and 
ability to stand back and criticise the actual substance 
of the legislation while still maintaining the role of 
the judiciary as one of giving effect to the intention 
of Parliament. Indeed the Legislature's intention was the 
basis of the criticism - that this particular piece of 
legislation did not fit in with the broad intention - as 
found in the main thrust of the licensing legislation and 
the original form of s.110. His criticism also illustrates 
the role of the judiciary in transport licensing; not only 
to divine legislative intention but to apply the rules to 
facts in a non-fictional commonsense way, to fairly 
administer the balance between the various interests, to 
secure a result which appears reasonable, and to guide the 
Licensing Authorities in their application of the Act. 
The inter-play of legislative amendment and judicial 
interpretation is itself evidence that the courts are indeed 
actively engaged in the substance of licensing. 
The facts of this case were that Colville Transport Ltd 
carried goods by road from Otahuhu to Coromandel. Both 
these points were within one Licensing District - the No. 2 
District and Colville's licence extended to the No.2 District 
only. There were three possible composite road-rail routes 
~, 
between Otahuhu and Coromandel: 
(1) From Otahuhu to Thames by rail and then by 
road to Coromandel. 
However this route was more than one-third longer 
than the shortest road route from Otahuhu to Coromandel 
and therefore did not serve to operate the restriction -
Reg . 2 4 ( 3 ) (a) . 
(2) From Otahuhu to Pokeno (Pokeno was in the No. 2 
District) by rail and then to Coromandel by road. 
But this route did not set the restriction into 
operation either because the rail length from Otahuhu 
to Pokeno was less than 40 miles. 
( 3) From Otahuhu to Te Kauwhata (which was outside 
the No. 2 District and in the No. 3 District) by rail and 
then to by road via back roads to Coromandel. 
This route had just over 40 miles of rail length in 
it but because of the back roads contained in the road 
portion it was not, and would not be used in practice. 
Thus the only route which the Railway Department 
could nominate as an available route was the third of 
three routes. However counsel for Colville argued that 
this route was not available for two reasons: 
(i) It was not in fact used 
(ii) Colville had no licence for the No. 3 District 
and therefore could not use the nominated route. 
Both these arguments failed. The first argument was 
covered by that part of subs. (2A) which provides that it 
does not matter that the goods would normally be carried 
solely between the stations nominated. North P. and 
Turner J. disposed of the argument on this basis (albeit 
rather more in passing than directly) 26 and Turner J. 
26. p.609 lines 21-39, p.617 lines 37-44 respectively 
dismissed the argument as irrelevant because the route 
actually used was a matter within the discretion of the 
. 27 consignor. The second argument failed on two grounds: 
first, Reg.24 states that there need only be 
"an available route for the carriage of goods" and not a 
route available to this licensee; 
secondly, the defendant was not on the horns of a 
dilemna on account of the need to accept goods under 
Reg.23 while being prohibited from going outside his own 
licensing district to carry them (Reg.24). Counsel for 
Colville had argued that it was obliged to accept all 
goods under Reg.23; that it was therefore obliged to 
accept the goods in question in this case; that if the 
third composite route is the route it must comply with to 
satisfy Reg.24 it must go outside its own licensing district 
to pick the goods up at Te Kauwhata; and therefore that 
it was on the horns of a dilemna - it must either refuse the 
goods - and thus commit an offence - or accept the goods 
and go outside its own Licensing District - thereby also 
committing an offence; the only solution to this dilemna 
was to say that the route was not available. The simple 
answer to this, readily provided by the court, was that 
Reg.23 only obliged carriers to accept goods "as authorised" 
by their licences. Thus Colville was not obliged to accept 
the goods at Te Kauwhata and was not in the dilemna en-
visaged.28 Thus the composite route was deemed to be an 
"available route". 
27. 
28. 
p. 613 lines 39-49 
This contention had been accepted in Donovan v ATW 
Transport Ltd (supra). The Court of Appeal in Colvrlle 
therefore disapproved that decision. In any case 
Reg.24 had been amended (by the addition of para (4) 
following the ATW case to make it clear that the 
composite route could require that the goods be taken 
to a different Licensing District. Given the correct 
interpretation of Reg.23 that amendment was probably 
superfluous. 
IV. THE COURTS AND SECTION 110 - A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
Thus far we have considered the nature and content of 
the policies behind the restriction, the framework of the 
restriction and the process of interpretation and applica-
tion of s.110 by the courts. In this section of the paper 
we shall be seeking to identify the proper role of the courts 
in dealing with the statutory framework of the restriction. 
We shall do this by examining the context within which the 
courts are operating. This context does not simply refer 
to the organisational structure of the licensing provisions. 
It also refers to the nature of the processes of decision-
making required at various points of the structure. The 
major aim of this section is to evaluate the courts' a p proach to 
s.110 and to comment upon the section itself. Our first 
concern will be to establish a methodological framework 
within which we may attempt this analysis. 
B. Policy, Principles, Rules 
We have seen that the courts- have been making decisions 
under s.110. The method by which we propose to analyse those 
decisions focusses upon two inter-related facets of decision-
making: the degree of discretion which the decision-maker 
has, and the nature of the guide-line (if any) fettering his 
discretion. 
Discretion and Guide-lines. Discretion is referred to 
by Jowe11 1 as ''the room for decisional manoeuvre possessed 
by a decision-maker." It is clear that the degree of 
discretion possessed by the decision-maker depends upon the 
degree of constraint imposed upon his room for decisional 
manoeuvre. Most often these constraints are in the form 
1. Jowell J. The Legal Control of Administrative 
Discretion L197i/ Public Law 178, 179. 
of specific guide-lines of which the decision-maker must 
take cognisance. Of course there are different kinds of 
guide-lines. We wish to consider two - rules and principles. 
However, before moving to discuss these it is appropriate 
that we identify and discuss the first part of the 
triumvirate - policy. 
1. Policy. 
Jowell defined policies as "broad statements of 
general objectives. 112 Dworkin3 said that "I call a 'policy' 
that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, 
generally an improvement in some economic, political or 
social feature of the community (though some goals are 
negative), in that they stipulate that some present feature 
is to be protected from adverse change)." Thus a policy 
exists at a more fundamental level than do principles and 
rules; furthermore it makes a more general statement. In 
so far as policies express aims they are the source of any 
principles and rules that are created in their service. One 
might therefore expect such principles and rules to reflect 
the policy from which they stem. It is therefore appropriate 
at this point to briefly reiterate the policies which lie 
behind the rail restriction. 
We saw earlier4 that the overall purpose of transport 
policy is to develop (in very broad terms) an efficient 
transport system. We also discovered that questions under 
this head are wide-ranging and extremely complex. We 
noted5 that the Transport Policy study described transport 
policy as a "seamless web" with a high degree of inter-
relationship between the various parts of the overall 
policy. Transport policy questions can be described in 
Fuller's terms as "polycentric problems. 116 A polycentric 
problem is one with many centres. Fuller chose to illustrate 
2. ibid p.183 
3. R.M. Dworkin The Model of Rules (1967) 35 
Un. of Chi L.R. 14, 23. 
4. Part II (supra) 
5. supra p.5. 
6. Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining LI96l/ 
Wisconsin Law Review, 3, 33. 
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the essential idea of the term by using the analogy of a 
spider's web: "Pull a strand here, and a complex pattern 
of adjustments runs through the whole web. Pull another 
strand from a different angle and another complex pattern 
emerges. 117 The point which both Fuller and Jowell make 
about polycentric problems is that they are normally 
inherently unsuited to decision by adjudication. However 
that is to anticipate our argument. The only point which 
we wish to make at this stage is that transport policy 
problems are polycentric, that specific policies spring 
from this base and thus contain polycentric elements. 
For instance decisions as to when a licence or exemption 
will be granted require an understandihg of the background 
to the problem together with an appreciation of the 
import of the policy. The policy itself springs from a 
highly complicated inter-model assessment with many centres 
of analysis, choice and consequence. 
We concluded that the rail restriction reflects a 
policy of protecting and promoting the Railways Department 
by preserving for it a certain proportion of goods haulage.
8 
As we noted this policy not only stems from a policy of pure 
protection but from decisions about overall transport 
efficiency, namely: that overall efficiency and the 
interests of users and providers of transport call for a 
restriction on competition with rail transport. 
All of the policy statements relating to the 
restriction which we have referred to or sighted have 
expressed these aims in broad terms. We now wish to 
examine the way in which this policy has been put into 
operation. Thus we turn to principles and rules and the 
structure within which they exist. 
2. Principles 
Before discussing the substance of this part of our 
7. ibid. 
8. supra pp 6-12 
model for analysis we wish to mention briefly the reasons 
why we are embarking upon this discussion. Principles 
are, of course, part of the analytical model which we have 
adopted. By this discussion we aim to distinguish 
principles from rules; to show that the rail restriction 
does provide one sphere within which decisions are made 
on the basis of principles; and in this fashion to begin 
to illustrate the proper role of the courts. 
Principles are different from rules in that they 
provide the decision-maker with a more general direction. 
While setting forward a particular policy they provide for 
far more flexibility of application than rules do. Hence 
they leave the decision-maker with more discretion than 
a rule does. One example will suffice9 A policy 
objective may be "To prevent unsafe driving." One example 
of a rule made under this policy would be a 50 k.p.h. 
speed limit. It is a rule because all we have to do to 
determine its application is to determine whether the 
prescribed event actually happened i.e. was the driver 
exceeding 50 k.p.h? However a principle would require "a 
qualitative appraisal of the fact, in terms of its probable 
1 · ·f . . .,lo 1 b consequences or mora Justi ication. An examp e can e 
given in the principle requiring drivers to exercise "due 
11 care". 
As Jowell notes a principle can be made more precise 
by the use of criteria specifying certain factors which 
may or may not be taken into account in making a judgment 
on the basis of the principle. A principle may also be 
made more specific by subsequent elaboration by the decision-
maker applying the principle. This capacity for elaboration 
constitutes another way in which principles are more flexible 
9. This example is drawn from Jowell (supra) pp 201-203. 
For a more complete discussion see pp 200-206. We note 
that, along with Dworkin and others we have subsumed 
principles and standards under the one head for the 
purposes of our treatment. 
10. ibid 
11. For an excellent discussion of the nature of principles 
(and rules and policy) see Jowell, Dworkin and Fuller 
(supra) together with H. Hart and A. Sacks The Legal 
Process (10th ed) 1959. 
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than rules: they may be developed on a case-by-case basis 
thereby changing and developing over time. 
We note four limits on the use of principles as 
factors by which decisions may be governed: 12 
(i) The reference to a standard or principle must be 
meaningful e.g. a principle may refer to a community 
consensus which does not exist or cannot be ascertained or 
is in an extreme state of flux. A decision on such a 
basis is highly vulnerable to well-founded criticism. 
(ii) Where principles are to be applied "by comparing 
the situation in question with other like-situationed 
situations, either those that are directly competing (as 
in a licence application) or existing in the community, the 
situations being compared must be capable of being placed 
13 in a similar class or category." i.e. like must be judged 
against like. 
(iii) Principles are not generally appropriate tools by 
which to evaluate unique or non-recurring situations. 
(iv) Polycentric problems may be unsuited to evaluation 
in terms of principles. If a principle is expressed in 
broad terms (e.g. "public interest") the parties to a 
dispute or application may not know what to direct their 
arguments to. On the other hand a precise set of principles 
governing a decision-maker may make a decision on a truly 
1 . bl . . bl 14 po ycentric pro em impossi e. 
We now turn to identify that sphere of the rail restri-
ction within which principles are the governing factors for 
decision-making. That sphere is the process of granting 
exemptions from the restriction. 
We noted earlier15 that the statutory framework is set 
12. ibid 
13. Jowell (supra) p.205 
14. We shall not discuss these limits in detail as the 
principal focus of this paper is not upon principles. 
However we note that the principles laid down for the 
Transport Licensing Authorities may be susceptible to 
justifiable criticism on some of these grounds. 
15. supra p.17 
up in such a way that a person who falls within the ambit 
of the restriction cannot carry goods in contravention of 
the restriction unless he obtains an exemption from the 
restriction. The bodies which have jurisdiction to deter-
mine an application for exemption are the Transport 
Licensing Authorities (together with the Transport Licensing 
Appeal Authority on appeal). Their decisions as to the 
grant or refusal of applications for exemption (which are 
usually made at the same time as an application for a 
licence - or amendment to a licence) are governed by 
principles imposed by the Act. 
The relevant section is s.123 which relates to 
applications for goods - service licenses and provides 
that in determining such applications: 
(1) the Licensing Authority "shall have regard to" 
(a) the interests of the public generally, 
- primarily those of persons requiring 
transportation facilities 
- secondarily those of persons providing 
transportation facilities; and 
(b) the needs of the district(s) 
(2) the Licensing Authority "shall further have 
regard to - " 
(a) applicant's financial ability; and 
(b) likelihood of his carrying on the service 
satisfactorily 
(3) "If, having regard to the matters mentioned in 
subsections (1) and (2) ... the Licensing 
Authority is satisfied that - " 
(a) the proposed service is desirable in the 
public interest; and 
(b) "The proposed service would not operate 
adversely to the public interest where the 
application involves exemption from the 
provisions of any regulations ... "(protecting 
the railways) -
the Licensing Authority shall grant the 
application ... unless it decides the grant 
of the application would - "injure materially 
the economic stability of the transport 
services of any kind .. " 
- or - "would prejudice the provision of or 
maintenance of a reasonable standard of living 
and satisfactory working conditions in the 
transport industry." 
We are specifically concerned with subs (3). (However 
we would point out the tiered order in which the Authority 
is to look at various aspects of an application). Subsection 
(3) requires the Authority to be satisfied that a service 
based on an exemption from the rail restriction "would not 
operate adversely to the public interest." In the terms 
mentioned above this is clearly a principle. The consequences 
do not automatically flow from the application of the 
principle to a given set of facts. The principle points in 
a certain direction but still calls upon the Authority to 
make a qualitative assessment of the implications of the 
facts. Moreover the principle is very vague. It requires 
elaboration in substance as well as in application to real 
situations. Therefore it leaves a high degree of discretion 
with the decision-maker. 
We shall cite but one example of the nature of the 
decision-making process undertaken by the Appeal Authority. 
Our purpose in doing so is to highlight certain features 
of the process of application of the principle. 
Appeal Decision 2407 16 A road haulage firm, by name 
Car Haulaways (N.Z.) Ltd, made a series of applications 
for extension of its licenses and exemption from the rail 
restriction. 17 Naturally enough in each case the granting 
of the extensions would have meant that the company would 
have had greater freedom to set its particular form of road 
transport in competition against New Zealand Railways. 
16. Butterworths Road Transport Licensing Appeals, Volume 
5, p.588. 
17. Appeal Decisions 1936, 1990, 2063, 2199 preceded A.D.2407. 
It is appropriate to note that there were various issues 
and facts determined in these former cases which can 
be seen to have fallen somewhere between res judicata and 
precedent in their effect on subsequent decisions. 
The applications were therefore opposed by N.Z.R. In 
disposing of the appeal the Appeal Authority made several 
observations which are pertinent to our discussion: 
(i) "The decisions of the Appeal Authorities enunciate 
certain principles which it is a Licensing Authority's 
duty to apply to the particular facts before him. 1118 
These principles were clearly envisaged as something in 
addition to the plain wording of s.123. It is worth 
commenting that the Appeal Authority has a profound dislike 
for hard and fast rules and attempts to ensure that it only 
develops principles as time and the cases flow by. Indeed 
the Appeal Authority was careful to note that he was not 
constrained or fettered by the previous Car Haulaways' 
decisions and that his task in relation to those decisions 
was to apply to the facts before him the principles which 
t b th d f h d . . 19 h were o e ga ere rom t ose ec1s1ons. Furt ermore 
at the conclusion of his decision he again pointed out 
"that there must never be any question of laying down a 
rule that may fetter the exercise of the discretions which 
are reposed in the Licensing Authorities under the Act. 1120 
These comments stand in an interesting juxtaposition with 
that made by Haslam J. in the Court of Appeal when deter-
mining the final appeal from this application. Haslam J. 
was focussing upon the flexibility of the statutory test 
(or principle) alone when he said that "with the same 
material before different tribunals, opposite decisions 
could well be pronounced in the application of such a test 
to the evidence in a contest of this kind. 1121 
Thus we observe that in this example the public 
interest test was seen as providing flexibility and 
discretion to the tribunals. Moreover this example is 
consistent with the general tenor of the Appeal Authority's 
decisions. It shows that the Appeal Authority considers that 
it has gone further than simply applying the broad public 
interest to every situation before it. 
18. supra p.599. 
19. ibid p. 589. 
20. ibid. p.599 
21. A-G v Car Ha ulaways (NZ) Ltd LT97!_72 NZLR 331, 339. 
S" I 
(ii) One might therefore ask what purpose is served by 
the enunciation of these principles. The Appeal Authority 
observed that "this enables would-be applicants to assess 
how their applications are likely to be dealt with and 
assists consistency of decisions 1122 Thus such principles 
outline more clearly the case which a party to a hearing 
has to meet. Such elaboration was certainly required in the 
case of the test provided by s.123. A test of 'public 
interest' is broad enough at any time let alone in regard 
to issues of transport licensing and the rail restriction 
(the complexity of which we have already referred to). 
(iii) The transcript of evidence before the Licensing 
Authority23 together with the decisions of the Licensing 
Authority and the Appeal Authority show reference to the 
following factors in determining the public interest: 
capacity for back-loading on journeys, damage to goods in 
transit, overall cost to consignors, overall efficiency, 
suitability of goods for carriage by rail, amount of incon-
venience or hardship caused by requiring carriage by rail, 
time in transit, national aspects of N.Z.R., future 
business for N.Z.R., profitability of carriage of particular 
goods for N.Z.R., loss to N.Z.R. if goods not carried. 
In many ways the Car Haulaways' cases 24 have given 
rise to the most comprehensive and sophisticated argument yet 
on an application for exemption from the restriction. Most 
of the previous cases do not reveal such a comprehensive 
inter-model assessment of road and rail transport. In 
many cases it seems that the public interest means simply 
protecting N.Z.R. from loss of traffic. Protection is of 
course the policy behind the restriction but the statute 
also allows for exemptions from the restriction. Thus it 
does not help very much to simply say that "the purpose 
is protection and protect we shall." The question of 
22. supra, p.599 
23. A massive 432 pages. 
24. One should include Appeal Decision 2580 in this list. 
when an exemption is appropriate is left untouched by 
such a reply. Thus the development of a set of principles 
to which applicants might address their arguments and 
with reference to which the Authorities may determine such 
applications. 
We do not propose to engage in a protracted debate 
about the finer points of the status of these factors. It 
may be that they are more appropriately called 'standards' 
than 'principles'. We have already noted that for our 
purposes we have subsumed both under the one head and 
concentrated upon the nature of the guide-line and the 
amount of discretion it leaves. These factors represent an 
elaboration on the statutory principle, constitute guide-
lines for the Authorities' decisions, are intended to be 
flexible and do not dictate a particular answer. 
The primary points which we wish to draw from this 
brief discussion of principles are these:-
- principles are more flexible than rules and 
accordingly give a decision-maker more room for decisional 
manoeuvre. 
- the Transport Licensing and Licensing Appeal 
Authorities are governed in their decision-making by 
a broad principle upon which they have elaborated. 
- the Authorities are specialist tribunals who 
inevitably build up a certain amount of expertise in the 
task of determining exemptions from the rail restr i ction. 
- therefore, there is a flexible specialist body which 
may be approached by persons who are caught by the net of 
the legal parameters of the rail restriction and who wish 
to obtain a substantive exemption from the restriction. 
3. Rules 
First, we wish to define what we mean when we refer 
to a 'rule'. Roscoe Pound declared that "Rule or rule of 
· 1 1 t 1125 law is often used for every type of ega precep. 
Obviously this would introduce the very kind of confusion 
which we are seeking to avoid. He went on to define the 
25. R. Pound, Jurisprudence (1959). Vol II at p.124 
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term more closely - "it means a legal precept attaching 
a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite 
detailed state of fact. 1126 Dworkin has supplied a useful 
elaboration: 
"The difference between legal principles and legal 
rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of 
standards point to particular decisions about legal 
obligation in given circumstances, but they differ 
in the character of the direction they give. Rules 
are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If 
the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either 
the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies 
must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision. 11 27 
While this statement usefully illustrates the distin-
ction we wish to point to Jowell's reservation about Dworkin's 
all-or-nothing approach: 28 
"It should not be assumed however that because rules 
are concrete guides for decision addressing themselves 
to specific fact-situations that their application can 
always be mechanical. As we have seen, a parking 
meter, for example, may simply register the end of 
a maximum time limit. But since rules are purposive 
devices (they are techniques to effect a broader 
policy) and because language is largely uncertain 
in its application to situations that cannot be 
foreseen, the applier of a rule will frequently be 
possessed of some degree of discretion to interpret 
its scope. In doing so he will go beyond the wording 
of the rule in order to discover and weigh controlling 
principles and policies. He will not be a passive 
"applier" but will himself be an agent in the rule's 
elaboration. 1129 
Thus a rule is the most precise form of general direc-
tion of those in the model which we have adopted. In 
Jowell's terms it is the most precise form because "it 
requires for its application nothing more or less than the 
26. ibid 
27. supra, at p.25 
28. It is not entirely apparent from this quotation but 
Dworkin views a decision-maker applying a rule as one 
who is simply carried in the main-stream of the rule 
and does not have a hand in its direction. He appears 
to envisage decision-making on the basis of rules as 
a quite mechanical process of compliance with the rule 
in application. With respect we do not agree with 
this approach. 
29. supra, pp. 201-202. 
happening or non-happening of a physical event. 1130 
Depending upon the precision with which it is drafted a rule 
will normally leave very little discretion indeed in the 
hands of the decision maker. Naturally the more vague and 
uncertain a rule is the more discretion it provides - and 
vice versa. Although we do not wish to make a rigid 
distinction we submit that this discretion to interpret 
the scope of a rule has two main aspects: one - inter-
pretation of the meaning of the rule; two - application 
of the meaning to a given set of facts. We reiterate 
that we do not see these as mutually exclusive; indeed there 
is a definite interdependence and dialectic between the two. 
Before departing from our definitional task we shall 
outline two examples of a rule. One example which we have 
already discussed is that of a 50 k.p.h. speed limit (supra) 
which we called as a rule because the pre-condition of its 
application is simply a finding of fact that Driver A was 
exceeding 50 k.p.h. On the assumption that the rule in 
the example creates an offence we see that the rule 
attaches "a definite legal consequence to a detailed state 
of fact. 1131 We also see that this technique of direction 
is different from that utilised by the principle that 
drivers must take "due care". To take a different example, 
a rule may provide that it is an offence for any person 
to appear in a public place without any clothes on. A 
principle concerning the same kind of behaviour might make 
it an offence to "indecently expose" ones-self in a public 
place. The rule simply asks whether X was found in a public 
place with no clothes on. The principle calls for a quali-
tative appraisal of that fact in terms of current standard 
standards of morality, decency, dress etc. In such an 
instance the policy would be one of attaining decorum and 
good conduct. 
We are now finally in a position to assess the role of the 
courts in interpreting and applying s.110. 
30. ibid p. 201. 
31. R. Pound, supra. 
C. Section 110 - A Rule? 
We submit that s.110 constitutes a rule in terms of the 
definition which we have adopted. It goes to considerable 
lengths to outline, in Pound's terms, "a definite detailed 
state of fact" to which it is to apply. Although 
paradoxically it is just this attempt which makes the 
section quite unclear and leaves some doubt indeed about 
the situations which it covers. 32 The section also attempts 
to attach "a definite detailed legal consequence" to the 
situations which it is found to apply to. Here too, the 
attempt at precision has created more uncertainty than it 
h 1 . . d 33 as e 1m1nate. 
Furthermore s.110 attempts to leave very little 
discretion indeed to persons applying it. The tenor of the 
section is highly mathematical - if x then y - without a 
qualitative appraisal of the implications of x. The one 
part of the section which appears to have in fact left room 
for some discretion (even though the legislature probably 
did not intend to) is found in the lack of a qualitative 
definition of the word 'available'. As we noted above 34 
the primary concern of the provisions is to quantitatively 
compute and select a route as available. No other attempt 
to define the meaning of the word is made within the section 
itself. Thus the task of interpreting has been left to 
the courts. Nevertheless the section remains a rule. 
D. The Courts and Section 110 - An Evaluation 
We might observe at this point that although s.110 
gives detailed coverage to the question of 'available route' 
its content is very broad. It is broad in the sense that 
there is an enormous variety of combinations of road and 
rail routes which might be said to be available. The section 
attempts to cover this variety and select certain routes 
only. We noted in Part II the difficulty which it 
encounters in achieving this. We also referred to the 
difficulties which the courts have had in interpreting 
and applying the rule. In evaluating these difficulties 
32. supra, pp. 30-38. 
33. ibid 
34. supra pp. 19-20 et seq. 
we wish to adopt the same two heads of analysis as we did 
in Part II: 
(a) the meaning of available in s.110 
(b) the substance of s.110 
(a) the meaning of 'available' in s.110 
We saw that in interpreting and applying the concept 
of an 'available route' the courts elaborated upon the 
rule in the sense that they said what they felt the words 
meant, and outlined the factors which they would, or would 
not, take account of in reaching their decisions. In 
Jowell's terms the courts have indeed been reasonably active 
"appliers" of the rule, looking beyond the wording "to 
discover and weigh controlling principles and policies" 
(supra). 
We have noted the courts' anticipation of a difficulty 
in deciding, as a question of degree, that a route is not 
available on the basis of economic, loading or frequency of 
service factors. However on the basis of our finding that 
s.110 is a rule we would question the degree of discretion 
h . h h . . 35 d . b 36 ( ) d w ic t e court in Mcvicar an Vi rapac supra seeme 
to wish to reserve for themselves. 
As we mentioned earlier Regulation 24 simply requires 
that there be an "available route for the carriage of goods". 
Thus in a prosecution on a charge of infringing s.108 and 
this regulation it should not be open to the courts to 
decide that a route is not available because it is not 
available to these particular goods. The regulation does 
not appear to give the courts the discretion which they 
wish to assume for themselves. The discretion to deter-
mine whether it is economically reasonable for a transport 
operator to use the rail to transport particular goods is 
vested in the specialist tribunals - the Licensing and 
Licensing Appeal Authorities. An operator is free to apply 
to the Licensing Authority for a substantive exemption 
from the restriction at any time. We have seen that the 
tribunals are accustomed to considering difficult issues 
of economic and loading considerations, have built up a 
35. supra 
36. supra 
certain expertise in the area and elaborated principles by 
which it will decide such issues. It is therefore more 
appropriate that such a discretion be exercised by the 
tribunals and not the courts. 
But the discretion of the tribunals only appertains to 
the substance of an exemption and not to a decision as to 
whether a route is available. However, the existence of 
this discretion does help us say that there is no real need 
for the courts to attempt to stretch the rule in the 
interests of justice and reasonableness. This may be 
achieved by another means - a substantive exemption. 
The tribunals' discretion on the basis of principles 
copes rather better with the same kinds of questions that 
the courts have been grappling with at the outer edges of 
the "available route" concept. Moreover the words of the 
rule have not changed over the course of time whereas 
transport technology has. In particular, the increasing 
trend to unitisation of loads has meant that there is a 
far greater possibility that a rail route may be a completely 
impracticable mode of carriage for particular kinds of goods. 
Indeed this argument has formed a major part of many 
applications for substantive exemptions. Principles are 
more able to cope with changes over time because they are more 
flexible. Therefore it may be the case that a principle 
which supplied guide-lines of a more fundamental nature may 
be a more appropriate way in which to guide decisions on 
availability. 
This same argument applies to decisions on cases brought 
under s.109. It seems that the court may ask whether the 
route is available for the carriage of the particular goods in 
question~ 7 Yet this only serves to open up the can of worms. 
The courts must then come to grips with a rule which provides 
little fundamental guidance as to the nature of availability 
but which overtly leaves little room for decisional-manoeuvre. 
Over the course of time the courts have envisaged the possi-
bility that the rule will encounter situations which it will 
not clearly meet. The courts have envisaged the exercise 
37. supra, p. 27 
of an enlargement of their discretion to apply and inter-
pret. Without the provision of more fundamental guide-
lines such forays are likely to be somewhat schizophrenic, 
definitely uncertain. Thus it seems that a principle may 
be a more suitable technique by which to guide decisions 
on the meaning of availability. 
(b) the substance of s.110 
We have noted the detailed nature of the provisions of 
s.110. An attempt has been made to define the situations to 
which the section applies (together with the consequences 
of application) in quite some detail indeed. Yet different 
sets of circumstances have cropped up under the rule which 
have not been provided for in its provisions. Thus the 
courts elaborated on the rule by attempting to ascertain 
the policy behind it (legislative intention) and to apply 
38 it in a common-sense, real, consistent and equal way. 
Thus the courts elaborated on the rule in their interpreta-
tion and application of it. In doing so they exercised 
discretion in the way in which they perceived it and related 
it to actual situations. Even at this point the rule showed 
some strain in that it could not do what it attempted to do -
lay down detailed consequences attaching to a detailed state 
of fact. 39 
The strain becomes more apparent in the new subsections 
(2) and (2A). In its search for detail and rigidity of 
application (thus attempting to limit the courts' discretion) 
the language and structure of the rule have become tortuous 
and unclear. Paradoxically the section now calls for an 
even greater search for its meaning. We would guess that the 
debate between the courts and the legislature over this 
section is not yet over. The nature of the debate is quite 
close to the heart of the courts. They are interested in 
applying the rule in a common-sense and practical way. 
The legislature has attempted to curb that tendency by allowing 
38. e.g. Donovan v Knight & Dickey Ltd (supra), 
Transport Department v Paterson (supra). 
39. Although we too would join with North P. Vibrapac 
(supra) in his call for an examination of the content 
and direction of the present rule. 
the Railway Department to select notional (or, fictional) 
routes at random. In doing so it has made the rule more 
difficult to apply. In so far as the rule leaves some 
uncertainty the courts may well approach the uncertainty in 
a common-sense way. 
In any case one suspects that there will soon be a 
fresh combination of facts which will not quite fit the 
rule. The past history of the rule certainly suggests that 
this may be the case. The nature of the problem itself 
also suggests that this will happen. The rule attempts to 
select one among a number of combinations of routes. The 
very nature of combinations is to produce new and 
different combinations. Therefore the present rule may soon 
confront a situation which it does not quite cover and 
again call upon the courts to exercise their discretion. In 
our opinion this situation calls more for a principle than 
it does for a rule. A principle would be flexible enough 
to cope with the changing and varied combinations of routes. 
Yet it would also be a more meaningful direction. It would 
(hopefully) not obscure the policy as much as the present 
rule in that it would point more directly, at a more funda-
mental level, to the reasons for particular decisions. The 
courts would then have a discretion to elaborate upon the 
principle on a case-by-case basis always bearing in mind the 
first principle of justice - the requirement of consistency, 
uniformity and equal treatment of those to whom the principle 
is to be applied. 
V APPRAISAL 
We have looked at the policies which lie behind the 
rail restriction. We have identified and discussed the 
legal parameters of the restriction,which is hopefully of 
use in its own right. Moreover we have seen something of 
the way in which a policy is transformed into a rule. 
In our discussion of the jurisprudential model which we 
chose as our tool of analysis we noted that rules are not 
the only way in which policies may be put into operation. 
Principles may be used instead. Indeed we noted that the 
transport licensing tribunals are guided by, and even create, 
principles as guide-lines for decision. We have found the 
model of policy, principles and rules to be useful to our 
analysis of the nature of s.110 and the role of the Court 
in interpreting and applying the section. For our purposes 
the most significant feature of this model was the way in 
which it illustrates the nature of the decision-making 
process. We found the identification and analysis of dis-
cretion to be singularly helpful in this regard. Thus the 
mode of analysis is perhaps noteworthy in its own right. 
In part IV of the paper we outlined our conclusions as 
to the nature of s.110, the role of the Courts in interpret-
ing and applying it and the dialectic between the two. At 
this point we wish to re-iterate our suggestion that the 
Courts may be laying claim to too much discretion in defin-
ing the word available. We would also point again to the 
unsatisfactory state of s.110. We believe that this section 
would be better cast in terms of a principle which would 
secure flexibility while providing a clearer, more funda-
mental and more meaningful set of guidelines. In any event, 
if s.110 is to remain a rule it should be a better one. It 
should be easier to understand, clearer in structure and 
language. We doubt whether this can be achieved without 
resort to principles. 
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